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1
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2
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3
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4
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- Both sides had the same data, but came to opposing conclusions. Neither side thought the other was
doing “Real Linguistics.”
- “Oppenheimer and I often have the same facts on a question and come to
opposing decisions – he to one, I to another. Oppenheimer has high
intelligence. He can’t be
analyzing and interpreting the facts wrong. I have high intelligence. I can’t be wrong. So with Oppenheimer it must be
insincerity, bad faith – perhaps treason” (Alvarez, p. 160).
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5
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- How do you deal with this problem?
- Shouldn’t there be a right and a wrong answer to every question?
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6
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- The Straw Man Charge: “x is arguing not against my real position, but
against a caricature of my position” (p. 161).
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7
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- Generative Semantics imitates Aspects
- “No matter what two theories look like, in terms of formalisms,
architecture, what-have-you, if they make the same empirical
predictions, they are just different ways of saying the same thing” (p.
162).
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8
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9
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- Oh, and by the way, Generative Semantics is also wrong.
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10
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- Katz’s arguments against generative semantics aren’t addressing the
theory as a whole, “but on the spare parts he has stitched and bolted
together to attack” (p. 161).
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11
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- a Larry and Tom love their respective wives.
- b Those men love Susan and Dot respectively.
- c That man loves Susan and Dot.
- Aspects: these sentences need at least 3 levels of representation –
surface structures, deep structures, and semantic representations.
- Generative Semantics: 2 levels of representation – a semantic
interpretation rule and a transformation.
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12
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- McCawley posited that if the middle level in the Aspects model were
tossed out, then one rule would do the trick. “For reasons of simplicity, therefore,
deep structure had to go” (p. 166).
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13
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14
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- The Generative Semanticists saw good reason to get rid of deep
structure.
- The Interpretive Semanticists had enough reason to keep it.
- In other words, the arguments go nowhere.
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15
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- Do Grammaticality (linguistic knowledge) and Acceptability (linguistic
performance) ever diverge?
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16
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- There are islands of grammaticality floating in a sea of
ungrammaticality.
- If transformations are going to make something ungrammatical, then
‘filters’ stop transformations from getting too powerful.
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17
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- LAD = Built-In Grammar
- We couldn’t learn language, create unique sentences, etc, with so little
experience without some inherent structure upon which to superimpose
language.
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18
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19
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- “Chomsky’s well-known arguments that language acquisition cannot be
accomplished purely by general purpose learning faculties should not
lead to the non sequitur of concluding that general purpose learning
mechanisms play no role in language acquisition: General purpose
learning faculties clearly exist . . . And it is absurd to suppose that
they shut off while language is being acquired” (p. 192).
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20
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21
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- “[McCawley] is interested far more in the properties of the cognitive
mechanism, Acquisition Device, than in its specific employment–a
definitive rationalist concern.
McCawley is interested at least as much in the way the mechanism
is put to work, and in the way it interacts with general-purpose
learning strategies, and in the character of the acquisition of
data–empiricist concerns all” (p. 192).
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22
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- Do either of these models adequately address both rationalist and
empiricist theoretical frameworks?
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